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Abstract. Cooperation is a sophisticated example of collective intelli-
gence. This is particularly the case for indirect reciprocity, where benefit
is provided to others without a guarantee of a future return. This is
becoming increasingly relevant to future technology, where autonomous
machines face cooperative dilemmas. This paper addresses the problem
of stereotyping, where traits belonging to an individual are used as proxy
when assessing their reputation. This is a cognitive heuristic that humans
frequently use to avoid deliberation, but can lead to negative societal im-
plications such as discrimination. It is feasible that machines could be
equally susceptible. Our contribution concerns a new and general frame-
work to examine how stereotyping affects the reputation of agents engag-
ing in indirect reciprocity. The framework is flexible and focuses on how
reputations are shared. This offers the opportunity to assess the interplay
between the sharing of traits and the cost, in terms of reduced coopera-
tion, through opportunities for shirkers to benefit. This is demonstrated
using a number of key scenarios. In particular, the results show that
cooperation is sensitive to the structure of reputation sharing between
individuals.
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1 Introduction
Cooperation is a sophisticated form of collective intelligence where individuals
become incentivised to help one another and benefit from a coalition. One par-
ticularly interesting but challenging form of cooperation is indirect reciprocity,
which is complex because it involves donating to a third party without any guar-
antee of future reciprocation. Cooperation in this form involves a small cost to
the donor, and a much larger benefit to the recipient. This is a hallmark of hu-
man behaviour that leads to a societal benefit, by providing a resource through
which unrelated individuals support each other [1, 3].
Extensive research has been successful in establishing conditions and mech-
anisms that promote indirect reciprocity. However, as machines are developed
that feature cognition and autonomy, interest in cooperation is reaching beyond
humans [20]. Transportation is just one emerging example where technology,
2 W. Bedewi et al.
through autonomous vehicles, will encounter cooperative decision making [14].
This scenario features latent indirect reciprocity, such as when one driver al-
lows another to manoeuvre in traffic. Journeys in congestion often depend on
this, such as when exiting a T-junction, without which safe progress would be
impossible in many cities.
Beyond technological scenarios, persistent human scenarios such as inter-
group conflict [37] continue to motivate the exploration of cooperation, and the
basis for it being sustained. The decision on whether or not to cooperate, when
called upon, is the fundamental issue. Reputation is an important component
that provides a currency through which cooperation can be recognised and sig-
nalled [24], allowing individuals to leverage future help when needed [22]. In
recent times reputation systems have also emerged to support decision making
in diverse areas of e-commerce [19, 31, 40] for example. There are also many areas
of work in multi-agent systems where the focus is to engineer protocols or rules
that seek to ensure cooperation is followed [46].
The origins of reputation systems come from behaviour in groups with hu-
mans being adept at using reputation to assess the integrity of others [34], as
a means to promote their survival. This allows groups to function and humans
are adept at creating heuristics, or cognitive short cuts, that allow them to find
potential cooperators without extensive deliberation. However these cognitive
short cuts can also have negative implications. In the context of driving dynam-
ics for example, the type of vehicle, its manufacturer, the age, gender or other
characteristics of the driver may well influence whether one driver helps another.
While this may appear insignificant, in the wider human context this behaviour
can have a major impact, being responsible for bias that fuels stereotyping [12],
resulting in potentially unwarranted discrimination and the spread of preju-
dice [26]. Divisive social consequences may result [15], leading to categorisation,
where the reputation that an individual incurs has no alignment to their actual
behaviour. This is a key component in theories concerning intergroup conflict.
These issues are also transferred to technological scenarios, depending on the
capacity of machines to align with human bias or foster it themselves [43].
1.1 Contribution
Our contribution in this work is a new and flexible framework that allows us
to explore how the sharing of reputation, by means of shared traits, affects
cooperation. The approach used involves agent-based simulation, where agents
have some freedom in how they adapt their behaviour based on probabilistically
copying the strategy of others, based on their success. This approach allows us to
explore conditions that either promote or impede cooperation. It should not be
confused with agent based approaches in knowledge engineering, where protocols
are sought that allow cooperation to be enforced based on individual behaviour
(e.g., [46]). It can be noted that the vast majority of psychological treatments of
stereotyping focus on the single trait case, despite increasing demands to capture
the ground truth of social organisation [4].
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Given very limited treatment of stereotyping from a complex systems per-
spective, the authors model it with abstraction, seeking to quantify the effects
of stereotyping initially in general terms. Indirect reciprocity is the basis for
our model, but other forms of cooperation could also be applied. The approach
is novel because models of indirect reciprocity conventionally assume that each
individual is represented by a unique reputation: in other words an individual’s
behaviour is entirely judged by their own actions. Stereotyping disrupts this
one-to-one mapping, resulting in reputations being implicitly shared by different
actors. In the context of cooperation, this means that individuals become de-
pendent on the donation behaviour of others for an element of their reputation.
Furthermore, our framework does not assume that “groups” to which indi-
viduals belong are mutually exclusive. Reputations are calculated on traits, any
number of which can be held by an individual. This better represents the fluid-
ity that is seen in the real world, where individuals are rarely totally defined by
a single group affiliation, but may be represented as a combination of charac-
teristics and affiliations. The paper examines how both repeated sharing of the
same trait, and sharing across multiple traits, affects the emergence of coopera-
tion. This provides a mechanism to assess the cost associated with stereotyping,
in terms of the effect on cooperation. To the best of our knowledge, no such
previous insight has been made in this direction.
2 Key related literature
This research focuses on indirect reciprocity, groups and the role of reputation.
Indirect reciprocity is frequently considered in the context of the donation game,
where an agent has to make a decision on whether or not to provide a donation.
This results in a cost c to the donor, and a benefit b to the recipient, and
necessarily c < b [5, 24]. Reputation systems act to signal an agent’s overall
donation behaviour to the wider population. Because other agents may use an
agent’s reputation in deciding when or not to donate, there is an incentive for
all potential recipients to maintain reputation at a sufficient level to yield future
donations [9, 21, 41].
Critical within reputation systems are assessment rules. These are the cri-
teria by which a donor’s reputation is adjusted in light of their actions, and
therefore govern the extent of reward over penalty. In this sense they have been
considered as a model for morality [1]. Three main alternatives for assessment
of cooperative action are image scoring, standing and judging. The first develop-
ment was standing [33], which was originally conceived for binary reputations.
This assessment rule effectively classifies each individual in the population as
either good or bad, penalising the good if they donate to the bad.
Image scoring [23, 41] presented the first significant alternative, where repu-
tation is simply incremented or decremented in response to donation or defec-
tion respectively. A limitation of image scoring is that those who choose not to
cooperate with defectors may be unfairly labelled as less cooperative [17, 28].
Consequently, with their roots in the work of Sugden [33], standing [28] and
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judging [6] have emerged as the alternatives that capture “legitimate shirking”
[10, 24, 30]. These discrimination rules have mainly been studied assuming that
reputation has a binary representation [5, 27], although this was generalised for
standing in [42].
The overwhelming convention is that individuals hold their own individual
reputation with similarity of reputation only introduced to address uncertainty
(e.g., [17, 23]). The point of deviation from this has occurred in the biological lit-
erature, specifically concerning the plausibility of group selection [44, 32]. These
models assume that individuals belong to precisely one group, and it is the group
entity that determines whether or not individuals propagate to future genera-
tions. This was largely dismissed by the biological literature but was revisited
when the idea of multi-level selection was proposed [45], where individual and
group identity coexist and may promote cooperation [25]. Reputation systems
can feature in this context, allowing individuals to potentially switch between in-
dividual and group reputations [18, 34]. However this still remains controversial
[29] as an explanation for biological evolution.
Psychological processes of categorisation are well seen in human behaviour,
and work relating to groups and cooperation has featured consideration of both
in-group bias [11, 13] and out-group prejudice [7, 43], while not necessarily invok-
ing the use of a group reputation. These contributions reflect the disposition of
individuals to differentiate, either implicitly or explicitly, based on their strong
identification with self-similar individuals [16]. Stereotyping is a related exten-
sion of this, where third party individuals are categorised together through a
perception of common characteristics [12]. This is well known to be a divisive
phenomenon in the human world [8, 36, 39].
In the case of reputation systems, only a few contributions consider categori-
sation. In [2] the impact of group reputation is considered through multi-agents.
Here, the concept of group reputation is shared by all individuals within a group
when they interact with out-group members. This is calculated as the average of
all individual reputations in a group, and assumes that group reputation is an
aggregation of the behaviour of individuals. Similarly in [18], a group structure
is proposed where individuals interact within their groups using a personal rep-
utation. When they play out-group, individuals adopt a group-level reputation.
This model also assumes that reputation is binary. These models do not allow
for individuals to share subsets of traits, or aspects of their identity, and depend
on individuals belonging to a single group. Our approach is to allow individuals
to have a more complex composition of their identity, based on assessment of
multiple traits against which reputations are maintained.
3 Model
The simulation model that is introduced pays attention to the structure of rep-
utation that agents hold when engaged in a cooperative dilemma (indirect reci-
procity). Rather than individuals necessarily holding their own unique reputa-
tion, or being identified by a single group membership, the concept of traits is
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introduced to represent how individuals may be perceived as belonging to groups
and judged through stereotypes. Traits are immutable features that are held by
agents, and represent identifiable characteristics. All agents have at least one
trait, and each trait may belong to one or more agents.
Rather than reputation being associated with individual agents or mutually
exclusive groups, it is assumed that each trait t has associated with it a repu-
tation rt, and an agent i derives its personal reputation r
i from the reputations
of the traits associated with i. Specifically, for an agent i, let Ti denote its as-
sociated set of traits, and then ri =
∑
t∈Ti rt/|Ti|. In other words, an agent’s
reputation is the average of the reputation of its associated traits.
This arrangement allows stereotyping to be considered: traits belonging to an
agent and shared by others are used as a proxy for their individual reputation.
Furthermore, traits do not necessarily partition agents into mutually exclusive
sets or groups, providing a useful generalisation. This approach is applied using
cooperation in the form of indirect reciprocity.
Indirect reciprocity. The donation game is adopted, which is a subclass of
the mutual aid game [33] where the donor incurs a cost with no guarantee of
reciprocation from the beneficiary, or any other individual. This is modelled
through prosocial donations which result in a cost c to the donor agent and a
benefit b to the recipient, where b > c > 0. There are wide ranging models for
indirect reciprocity (e.g., [17, 23, 27, 38]), however this work uses the recent and
remarkably simple approach of social comparison of reputation [42]. This follows
the human disposition to make relative judgements about the standing of others.
Each agent i carries a binary vector of variables (si, ui, di) which represents
i’s current action rule with respect to i’s donation behaviour when it is called
upon to consider making a donation to another agent j. The action rule indicates
whether or not i donates when similarity (si), upward (ui), or downward self-
comparison (di) is observed by i in respect of j’s reputation (r
j), as compared to
i’s own reputation value (ri). Similarity in self-comparison is identified when rj =
ri, upward self-comparison occurs when rj > ri, and downward self-comparison
occurs when rj < ri.
Periodically each agent updates its action rule through social learning, as a
consequence of observing others in the population. It is known [42] that evolution
promotes the action rule (1, 1, 0), allowing agents to discriminate against those
having a lower reputation than themselves, thereby representing a relative threat.
Updating reputation. Every time an agent i is called to play the donation
game with a potential recipient j, i’s donation decision depends on the agent’s
action rule and reputation is updated as a consequence. The concept of standing
is used. Specifically, it is assumed that agent i has a set of traits Ti. If i donates,
then rt is incremented, for all t ∈ Ti. If rj ≥ ri and i defects then the reputation
of trait t, rt is decremented, for all t ∈ Ti. This means that an individual’s
actions equally affect the traits by which it is represented. Note that the updating
approach ensures that a reduction in reputations does not occur when i fails to
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donate and j is of a lesser reputation, providing a defence against shirkers. Each
trait’s reputation is allowed to vary in the integer range [-5,5].
Performing the game. The donation game is performed on a set of agents A
representing a population of individuals, in this case |A| = 100. Each agent i has
four key fundamental attributes: its set of traits Ti, its action rule (si, ui, di), its
reputation ri and its fitness fi. Note that r
i =
∑
t∈Ti rt/|Ti|, and ri allows agents
to play the donation game and fitness represents the accumulation of costs and
benefits that are paid and received by i over a generation. A generation involves
making 5,000 random selections of a potential recipient j, from the population,
to play the donation game. For an agent j, the potential donor agent i is selected
from the sub-population having at least one trait from Tj , with probability s.
Here s is a global parameter (not to be confused with si) that governs the extent
to which an agent is disposed to playing in-group (i.e., with similar others).
At the end of a generation, reproduction occurs. This can be thought of as
social learning where agents probabilistically copy the action rules of others,
taking into account the success of other agents based on their fitness. Specifi-
cally, each agent i in the population copies the action rule of another agent j
with probability fj/
∑n
k=1 fk, upon which i adopts j’s action rule for the next
generation.
At this point mutation is applied to each element of an action rule with
probability 1/100. Prior to commencing a new generation, fitness fi is set to
zero (fi = 0,∀i) and for all traits t, rt = 0 is set. Throughout a c/b ratio of 0.7
is applied. 100,000 generations are performed and the simulation is principally
evaluated by comparing the total number of instances of cooperation (i.e., i
donating to j in a donation game) across all generations. Average figures of
cooperation over 5 randomly seeded runs are used.
4 Experiments
The model provides the option for agents to experience different types of rep-
utation sharing with other agents. An agent is dependent if it shares at least
one trait with another agent. Otherwise the agent is independent. If an agent i
is such that |Ti| > 1 then i is a multi-trait agent. Otherwise i is a single-trait
agent. Dependent agents provide the means for stereotyping to take hold. This
is investigated in two ways: firstly the effect of dependent single-trait agents on
the evolution of cooperation (Section 4.1); secondly the effect of a dependent
multi-trait agent on the evolution of cooperation (Section 4.2).
4.1 Dependent single-trait agents
This section considers the effects of a single common trait t being shared by
a set of single-trait agents. Let Gt be the set of all agents i having Ti = {t}.
Specifically, the maximum size of Gt is determined through which cooperation
can be sustained. Note that if all agents are single-trait and independent, their
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(a) |Gt|=4 single-trait dependent
agents who share trait t = 1.
(b) One multi-trait dependent
agent, and five single trait depen-
dent agents.
Fig. 1. Alternative agent-trait relationships for single-trait and multi-trait agents.
reputation is based entirely on their own past interactions and the results in
[42] are replicated. At the other extreme, if all agents are dependent and share
a single trait, then agents are (almost) entirely judged on the actions of others,
and a greater incentive to defect is expected. The format of this experiment is
visualised in Figure 1(a) and the results are shown in Figure 2(a). Two patterns
emerge: firstly cooperation declines rapidly after 15 dependent single-trait agents
share a common trait. Secondly, the average cooperation declines as s increases.
The lack of a distinguishable personal reputation for dependent single-trait
agents means that the reputational benefit of donation is shared with others, but
the cost is borne by the individual. This provides an opportunity for defective
strategies to take hold, where free riders can benefit from enjoying a shared
reputation without donating. However this cannot be sustained at scale, leading
to the global collapse of cooperation. In fact, as the number of dependent agents
increases, the reputation of the shared trait can also increase in value. This leads
to greater exploitation by free riders.
Figure 3, shows the action rules of agents across different values of s, compar-
ing instances of the defector strategy (0, 0, 0) with instances of the discriminator
strategy (1, 1, 0); which has been known to be dominant when all agents carry
their own unique reputation [42]. Prioritising interaction with those who share
the same trait (i.e., high s) accelerates the collapse of cooperation further as
the discriminative strategy directs donations towards agents with similar repu-
tation. When s is low, dependent single-trait agents interact mainly with those
who don’t share their reputation as they are still incentivised to adopt coop-
erative strategies to maximise their fitness with a reduced risk of exploitation.
4.2 Dependent multi-trait agents
This section considers the effect of introducing a single dependent multi-trait
agent in a population of single-trait agents, as shown in Figure 1(b). The re-
sults (Figure 2(b)) show that as the size of the set T1 of the multi-trait agent
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(a) Dependent single-trait agents. (b) Dependent multi-trait agent.
Fig. 2. Figure (a) shows the relationship between cooperation, parameter s, and the
size of the set Gt of agents sharing a common trait (see Figure 1(a)). Figure (b) shows
the effect of increasing the size of the set of traits T1 of a single multi-trait agent on
cooperation, in a scenario where all other agents are single trait (see Figure 1(b)).
Fig. 3. Distribution of action rules (0, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 0) by generation for the sets of
single-trait dependent agents Gt and independent agents A − Gt. |Gt| = 10 and s =
0 (left), 0.5 (middle), and 1 (right).
increases, cooperation diminishes. The sharing of the multi-trait agent’s reputa-
tion is dispersed across single-trait agents who between themselves have no trait
in common. This helps to suppress the rise of defective action rules, as compared
to the previous scenario (Section 4.1). In fact, |T1| can reach a considerable size
(e.g., 30-35 traits) before which cooperation starts to significantly diminish.
In this scenario, single-trait dependent agents rely entirely on themselves and
the multi-trait agent for their reputation. Each single-trait dependent agent can
also free ride on the single multi-trait agent, and this opens the opportunity for
defection to establish itself, although to a lesser extent than the case presented
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Fig. 4. The figures show the relationship between agents and traits for two dependent
multi-trait agents (left) and the average cooperation produced as a function of the size
of the intersection between the sets belonging to agents one and two for different values
of |T1| where s = 0 (right).
in Section 4.1. When the number of traits of the multi-trait agent is relatively
small, the presence of free riding dependent single-trait agents can be sustained
without too much disruption to the reputation of the multi-trait agent. As |T1|
increases, and the number of dependent single-trait agents increases, there is a
greater opportunity for free-riding action rules to take hold. At the same time,
there are fewer independent single trait agents available in the population. This
promotes the collapse of cooperation. As soon as a defective strategy takes hold
across the population, it then opens the opportunity for this to spread to other
agents. Interestingly, s has relatively little impact on whether dependent agents
prioritise playing with those that have a common trait. However, they are less
likely to have equal reputation in this instance.
Finally a second multi-trait agent is added, by replacing a single-trait agent
(agent number 2) in Figure 1(b), where T2 ⊆ T1. Figure 4 shows the effect of
varying |T2∩T1|, that is the extent to which T2 has the same traits as T1. These
results show that high proportions of shared identity through multi-trait agents
undermine the reputation system. Because the second multi-trait agent can hold
a large subset of the first agent’s traits, it can heavily disrupt the first agent’s
reputation, by using defection as its action rule. This effect is more pronounced
than that of a dependent single trait agent sharing reputation with the multi-
trait dependent agent, and increases as |T2 ∩ T1| increases.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Through a general framework for considering reputation, the authors have found
that reputation systems for cooperation are heavily disrupted by the sharing of
reputation through common traits. Stereotyping takes place, where traits are
used as proxy for indirectly assessing an individual’s reputation. This introduces
the opportunity for agents to disconnect their actions from their reputation.
Agents can deploy defective strategies: that is an agent can avoid paying the full
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costs of donation but receives donations based on the reputation aligning with
its associated traits. How the reputation is shared, through inheritance of traits,
is highly influential. Holding multiple traits presents an opportunity for agents
to share a limited proportion of their identity with others. In doing so they have
the potential to better control their exposure to defectors.
Single-trait and multi-trait agents are differentiated in how other agents can
share their traits. Under uniform conditions, single-trait agents have a reduced
chance of others having a trait in common. However, when another agent shares
their trait, their reputation becomes susceptible to the actions of a third party.
In contrast, for multi-trait agents, increasing the number of traits can give them
a chance to retain an element of unique personal identity, through traits that
aren’t shared with others. Moreover, for multi-trait agents, sharing can occur
with a number of agents that have no dependency between them, in terms of
common traits.
Given the enormous number of possible ways in which traits can be shared, in
this work our focus has concerned assessing basic aspects of sharing, surrounding
the number of traits held by an agent. The results show that reasonable levels of
cooperation can be sustained while there is a modest level of sharing of identity
in the population, after which cooperation collapses.
This highlights the importance of individual versus group identity in repu-
tation systems. It also warrants further investigation, being an important issue
relevant to identity fusion [35], where effectively an individual’s personal iden-
tity becomes identical to that of the group - in other words, distinguishable
personal traits diminish. Understanding the extent to which personal identity,
group identity and cooperation trade-off against each other, is an important fu-
ture goal. The exploratory work in this paper validates the framework presented
as a means to accomplish this.
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